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Abstract
Monte Carlo simulation is used in [13] to characterize a standard stochastic framework in-
volving a continuum of random variables that are conditionally independent given macro
shocks. This paper presents some general properties of such Monte Carlo sampling pro-
cesses, including their one-way Fubini extension and regular conditional independence. In
addition to the almost sure convergence of Monte Carlo simulation considered in [13], here
we also consider norm convergence when the random variables are square integrable. This
leads to a necessary and sufficient condition for the classical law of large numbers to hold
in a general Hilbert space. Applying this analysis to large economies with asymmetric in-
formation shows that the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is
resolved asymptotically for almost all sampling economies, corresponding to some results
in [21] and [24].
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1 Introduction
Following the early writings [20, 4], macroeconomists have made widespread use of a model of
an economy with many agents who face individual random shocks. These shocks are typically
modelled as a continuum of random variables that are conditionally independent given common
macro level shocks. Proposition 4 in [13], however, shows that in this framework, the joint
measurability condition that is usually imposed on a stochastic process can be satisfied only
if there is essentially no idiosyncratic risk at all. The approach of Monte Carlo simulation
is then used in [13] to characterize when, even in the absence of the usual joint measurability
assumption, the standard stochastic framework for many heterogeneous agents facing individual
uncertainty may still be valid. This paper provides a systematic study of the underlying Monte
Carlo sampling processes. We also present an application involving allocations in large exchange
economies with many asymmetrically informed consumers. In particular, we show how Monte
Carlo sampling helps resolve the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency
vanishes in the limit as the number of agents tends to infinity.
Let
I × Ω 3 (i, ω) 7→ gi(ω) ∈ X
be a process with a continuum of random variables, indexed by members i of an atomless
probability space (I, I, λ), all defined on the same sample probability space (Ω,F , P ), and
taking values in a Polish space X. Let I∞ and X∞ denote the Cartesian product of infinitely
many copies of the sets I and X respectively, with typical members i∞ = 〈ik〉∞k=1 and x∞ =
〈xk〉∞k=1. Then the corresponding Monte Carlo sampling process G is a mapping
I∞ × Ω 3 (i∞, ω) 7→ G(i∞, ω) = 〈g(ik, ω)〉∞k=1 ∈ X∞ (1)
When the process g has a stochastic macro structure, as defined in Section 2.3, Theorem 1
shows that so does the Monte Carlo sampling process G. In this case, the process G also has
the property of admitting a “one-way Fubini extension” that makes G jointly measurable with
respect to an extension of the usual product σ-algebra.
The Monte Carlo simulation approach in [13] uses the almost sure convergence of the
sample averages. For a square-integrable process, we also consider here the case of norm
convergence. Based on the iterative extension of an infinite product measure introduced in [12],
we formulate a “sharp” law of large numbers, requiring norm convergence of sample averages
only for all sequences outside an iteratively null set, rather than a smaller classical null set. We
prove that a process with square-integrable random variables satisfies this sharp law if and only
if it is both Gel ′fand-integrable and norm integrably bounded in the Hilbert space of square
integrable random variables. In other words, this result characterizes those processes with
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square-integrable random variables whose average conditional expectation, given the macro
states, can be estimated using Monte Carlo simulation.
For allocations in a finite-agent asymmetric information economy, it is well known that
there is a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency (see, for example,
Example 0.1 on p. vi of [10]). The papers [21] and [24] show the (approximate) consistency of
incentive compatibility and efficiency by working with, respectively: (i) a large but finite set of
agents; (ii) a continuum of agents. In this paper, in the setting of a sequence of economies that
result from Monte Carlo sampling, we show that the conflict between incentive compatibility
and Pareto efficiency is resolved asymptotically for almost all infinite sequences of economies.
This corresponds to the asymptotic result for replica economies in [21], and the exact result
in [24] when private signals are generated by a process that is jointly measurable in a two-way
Fubini extension.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes some basic definitions.
Some general properties of the Monte Carlo sampling processes are presented in Section 3.
Section 4 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the classical law of large numbers to
hold in a general Hilbert space. As an illustrative application, Section 5 shows that in a Monte
Carlo sampled sequence of economies with asymmetric information, incentive compatibility and
Pareto efficiency are asymptotically consistent. Additional definitions and all the proofs are
given in the Appendix.
2 Basic formulation
2.1 Monte Carlo sampling processes
We model a continuum 〈gi〉i∈I of random variables indexed by i ∈ I as a process g : I×Ω→ X
where:
1. (I, I, λ) is an atomless probability space, often the Lebesgue unit interval, whose typical
member is an index i that identifies one particular economic agent;
2. (Ω,F , P ) is a probability space that represents the overall risk in the process;1
3. (X,B) is a Polish space with its Borel σ-algebra;
4. each indexed function gi : Ω→ X is measurable, so a random variable;
5. for each fixed B ∈ B, the mapping I 3 i 7→ (P ◦ g−1i )(B) from I to the probability that
gi(ω) ∈ B is measurable.
1We follow the convention that a probability space is assumed to be countably additive, as well as complete
in the sense that the σ-algebra F includes all subsets of every P -null set.
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A (Monte Carlo) sample of the indices i ∈ I is a countable collection i∞ = 〈ik〉∞k=1
drawn from the iteratively completed infinite product probability space (I∞, I¯∞, λ¯∞) defined
in Section 6.1. This space was introduced in [12] as the usual infinite product probability space
(I∞, I∞, λ∞) extended so that the σ-algebra I¯∞ includes iteratively null sets.
Corresponding to each (Monte Carlo) sample i∞ = 〈ik〉∞k=1 of indices is a countable
sequence 〈gik〉∞k=1 of random variables. This constitutes a (Monte Carlo) sample from the
continuum of random variables Ω 3 ω 7→ gi(ω) ∈ X as i varies over I. This sample, with
i∞ ∈ I∞ fixed, can be regarded as part of one meta or (Monte Carlo) sampling process G
defined by (1).
2.2 One-way Fubini property
The following definition was introduced in [11].
Definition 1 A probability space (I × Ω,W, Q) extends the usual product probability space
(I × Ω, I ⊗ F , λ× P ) provided that W ⊇ I ⊗ F , with Q(E) = (λ× P )(E) for all E ∈ I ⊗ F .
The extended space (I×Ω,W, Q) is a one-way Fubini extension of the product probability
space (I × Ω, I ⊗ F , λ × P ) provided that, given any Q-integrable function I × Ω 3 (i, ω) 7→
f(i, ω) ∈ R:
(i) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the random variable ω 7→ fi(ω) is integrable on (Ω,F , P );
(ii) the function i 7→ ∫Ω fi dP is integrable on (I, I, λ), with ∫I×Ω f dQ = ∫I (∫Ω fi dP ) dλ.
A process g : I × Ω → X is said to satisfy the one-way Fubini property if there is a
one-way Fubini extension (I × Ω,W, Q) such that g is W-measurable.
2.3 Regular conditional independence
A σ-algebra C on Ω is said to be countably generated if there exists a countable family {Cn }∞n=1
of subsets of Ω that generates C. Given a complete probability space (Ω,F , P ), a sub-σ-algebra
C of F is said to be countably generated if it is the strong completion of a countably generated
σ-algebra C′, in the sense that
C = {A ∈ F | ∃A′ ∈ C′ : P (A4A′) = 0 }
Definition 2 Let g be a process from I × Ω to the Polish space X with its Borel σ-algebra B.
Let C be a countably generated sub-σ-algebra of F in the complete probability space (Ω, I, P ).
Let M(X) denote the space of probability measures on the space (X,B).
1. Two random variables φ and ψ that map (Ω,F , P ) to X are said to be conditionally
independent given C if, for any Borel sets B1, B2 ∈ B, the conditional probabilities satisfy
P (φ−1(B1) ∩ ψ−1(B2)|C) = P (φ−1(B1)|C)P (ψ−1(B2)|C) (2)
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2. The process g is said to be essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C if, for
λ-a.e. i1 ∈ I, the random variables gi1 and gi2 are conditionally independent given C for
λ-a.e. i2 ∈ I.
3. An I ⊗ C-measurable mapping µ from I ×Ω to M(X) is said to be an essentially regular
conditional distribution process of g given C if, for λ-a.e. i ∈ I, the C-measurable mapping
ω 7→ µiω is a regular conditional distribution P (g−1i |C) of the random variable gi.
4. The process g is said to be regularly conditionally independent given C if g is essentially
pairwise conditionally independent given C, and also g admits a stochastic macro structure
(C, µ) in the form of an essentially regular conditional distribution process µ given C.
3 Properties of Monte Carlo sampling processes
Let g be a process from I × Ω to X and C a countably generated sub-σ-algebra of F in
(Ω,F , P ). Suppose that g is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C and admits
an essentially regular conditional distribution process I × Ω 3 (i, ω) 7→ µiω ∈ M(X) given C.
By Theorem 1 in [14], there exists a one-way Fubini extension (I × Ω,W, Q) such that the
process g is W-measurable.
The following theorem shows that the Monte Carlo sampling process G defined by (1) has
the one-way Fubini property. It also shows that G satisfies regular conditional independence
given C, and identifies its regular conditional distribution process.
Let M(X∞) denote the set of probability measures on the infinite product measurable
space (X∞,B∞).
Theorem 1 Let G : I∞ × Ω → X∞ be a Monte Carlo sampling process of g. Then there
exists a one-way Fubini extension (I∞ × Ω, W˜, Q˜) of (I∞ × Ω, I¯∞ ⊗ F , λ¯∞ ⊗ P ) such that G
is W˜-measurable. In addition, G is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C. It
also admits the essentially regular conditional distribution process µ¯ defined by
I∞ × Ω 3 (i∞, ω) 7→ µ¯(i∞, ω) :=
∞∏
k=1
µ(ik, ω) ∈M(X∞) (3)
4 Characterizing a sharp law of large numbers
Let g be a process from I × Ω to X as in Section 3, and let h : I × X → R be an I ⊗ B-
measurable function with
∫
I
[∫
Ω h
2
i (gi(ω)) dP
]
dλ < ∞. Then Lemma 11 in [13] says that for
λ¯∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞, one has
1
n
n∑
k=1
h(ik, g(ik, ω))→
∫
I
[∫
X
h(i, x) dµiω
]
dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω
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Under the framework of one-way Fubini extension, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let G : I∞ × Ω → X∞ be the Monte Carlo sampling process of g. Suppose that
(I∞ × Ω, W˜, Q˜) is a one-way Fubini extension of (I∞ × Ω, I¯∞ ⊗ F , λ¯∞ ⊗ P ) such that G is
W˜-measurable. Then for Q˜-almost all (i∞, ω) ∈ I∞ × Ω, one has
1
n
n∑
k=1
h(ik, g(ik, ω))→
∫
I
[∫
X
h(i, x) dµiω
]
dλ
Let L2(P ) be the space of real-valued square integrable functions on (Ω,F , P ), made into
a Hilbert space by defining, for any pair ϕ,ψ ∈ L2(P ), the standard inner product 〈ϕ,ψ〉 :=∫
Ω ϕ(ω)ψ(ω) dP . For each fixed i ∈ I, define the random variable f(i)(·) so that
Ω 3 ω 7→ f(i)(ω) = h (i, g(i, ω)) ∈ R (4)
The assumption that
∫
I
[∫
Ω h
2
i (gi(ω)) dP
]
dλ < ∞ implies that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the
random variable f(i) is an element in the Hilbert space L2(P ). Corollary 1 indicates that the
sample average 1n
∑n
k=1 f(ik)(ω) converges Q˜-almost surely to
∫
I
[∫
X h(i, x) dµiω
]
dλ. Since the
function I 3 i 7→ f(i) takes values in the Hilbert space L2(P ), a natural question is whether
one can obtain a similar result for convergence in the norm of L2(P ). This is answered in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 For λ¯∞-almost all i∞ ∈ I∞, one has∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
f(ik)−
∫
I
[∫
X
h(i, x) dµiω
]
dλ
∥∥∥∥∥→ 0
where the random variable ω 7→ ∫I [∫X h(i, x) dµiω] dλ is in L2(P ), and ‖·‖ denotes the standard
norm on the Hilbert space L2(P ).
This result can be viewed as the classical law of large numbers for a sequence of random
variables taking values in the Hilbert space L2(P ). One may wonder whether such a result can
be extended to other Hilbert spaces, or to Banach spaces more generally.
Let B be a Banach space, with norm ‖ ·‖ and norm dual B′. Given any b ∈ B and b′ ∈ B′,
let 〈b, b′〉 denote the real value of the continuous linear mapping b′ evaluated at b. In the case
when B is a Hilbert space, we shall denote it by H. Then, of course, 〈b, b′〉 can be regarded as
the inner product.
Henceforth we use the respective abbreviations LLN and SLLN for the law of large
numbers, and the sharp law of large numbers.
Definition 3 Let f be a function from (I, I, λ) to a Banach space B.
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1. The function f is said to satisfy LLN (resp., SLLN) if there exists a ∈ B such that
‖a − 1n
∑n
k=1 f(ik)‖ → 0 λ∞-a.s. (resp., λ¯∞-a.s.). Let LLN(B) (resp., SLLN(B) denote
the (linear) space of all functions from I to B that satisfy LLN (resp., SLLN).
2. The function f is said to be Gel ′fand integrable if there exists a vector b ∈ B called the
Gel ′fand integral of f such that, for all b′ ∈ B′, the real-valued function i 7→ 〈f(·), b′〉
on I is λ-integrable, with
∫
I〈f(i), b′〉dλ = 〈b, b′〉.2
3. A function f∗ : I → R+ norm dominates f : I → B if ‖f(i)‖ ≤ f∗(i) for λ-a.e. i ∈ I.
The function f is said to be norm integrably bounded if there exists a λ-integrable
function f∗ : I → R+ that norm dominates f .
From now on, let L(λ,B) denote the (linear) space of all functions f from (I, I, λ) to B
that are both Gel ′fand integrable and norm integrably bounded. The following Proposition is
well known in the literature on random variables with values in a Banach space. For Part (1),
see for example [17, Theorem 2.4]. Part (2) is taken from [8, Theorem 3.1].
Proposition 2 (1) LLN(B) ⊆ L(λ,B) for any Banach space B.
(2) Suppose that I is a Polish space, that I is its Borel σ-algebra, and that λ is an
atomless probability measure. There is a Hilbert space H such that L(λ,H) is not equal to
LLN(H).
Part (1) of Proposition 2 says that a necessary condition for f to satisfy the usual LLN
is that f must be both Gel ′fand integrable and norm integrably bounded. On the other hand,
Part (2) of Proposition 2 shows that these two conditions are not sufficient for the LLN to
hold, even for the special case of a Hilbert space. It means that LLN(B) is in general a proper
subset of L(λ,B).
The following theorem shows that when the product measure λ∞ is extended to its
iterated completion λ¯∞, not only does the strengthened inclusion SLLN(B) ⊆ L(λ,B) hold for
a general Banach space B, but it becomes an equality in the Hilbert space case. This equality
provides a very general characterization of the functions from (I, I, λ) to a general Hilbert
space H that satisfy our sharp law of large numbers in the iterated completion of the product
probability space. Moreover, an obvious corollary of our results is that LLN(B) is in general a
proper subset of SLLN(B), even when B is a Hilbert space.
2This follows the terminology of [8] and [17]. When the Gel ′fand integral of 1Sf is defined for every S ∈ I,
this is often called the Pettis integral — see, for example, [1] and [7, p. 53]. Note that 1S is the indicator function
of the set S.
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Theorem 2 (Sharp law of large numbers) If f is any function from (I, I, λ) to a Banach
space B for which SLLN is satisfied, then f ∈ L(λ,B); that is, SLLN(B) ⊆ L(λ,B). More
importantly, if B is a Hilbert space H, then f satisfies SLLN if and only if f is Gel ′fand
integrable and norm integrably bounded. That is, SLLN(H) = L(λ,H).
Consider the function f from (I, I, λ) to the Hilbert space L2(P ) which is defined by
(4). Because ‖f(i)‖ = (∫Ω h2i (gi(ω)) dP ) 12 and ∫I [∫Ω h2i (gi(ω)) dP ] dλ < ∞, the function f is
obviously norm integrably bounded. The following claim, which says that such a function f is
also Gel ′fand integrable, indicates why Proposition 1 is a special case of Theorem 2.
Claim 1 Let f be the function from (I, I, λ) to L2(P ) defined by f(i)(ω) = h (i, g(i, ω)) in the
paragraph above Proposition 1. Then, f is Gel ′fand integrable.
5 Allocations in large economies with asymmetric information
5.1 The information structure
We use the same information structure as that set out in [24]. Suppose that the fixed atomless
probability space (I, I, λ) represents the space of economic agents. Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sK}
denote the finite set of true states of nature (with power set denoted by S). We assume that
these are not known by any agent. Let T 0 = {q1, q2, . . . , qL} denote the space of all possible
signals (or types) for each individual agent. We consider the measurable space (T, T ) of private
signal or type profiles for all the agents i ∈ I. Thus, T is a subset of (T 0)I , the space of all
functions from I to T 0.3 For each agent i ∈ I, the function value t(i) (also denoted by ti) is
agent i’s private signal, whereas t−i is the restriction of the signal profile t to the set I \ {i}
of agents different from i; let T−i denote the set of all such t−i. For simplicity, we assume that
(T, T ) has a rich enough product structure so that T is a product of T−i and T 0, whereas T is
the product σ-algebra of the power set T 0 on T 0 with a σ-algebra T−i on T−i. Given any t ∈ T
and t′i ∈ T 0, we shall adopt the usual notation (t−i, t′i) to denote the signal profile whose value
is t′i for agent i, but the same as tj for all other agents j ∈ I \ {i}.
To represent all the uncertainty about the true states as well as the agents’ signals,
we consider the probability space (Ω,F , P ) where (Ω,F) is the product measurable space
(S×T,S⊗T ). Let PS and P T be the marginal probability measures of P on (S,S) and (T, T )
respectively. For each i ∈ I, let s˜ and t˜i denote the projection mappings from Ω to S and to T 0
respectively, with t˜i(s, t) = ti.
4 After excluding any PS-null state, we assume without loss of
3 The standard literature usually assumes that different agents have different sets of possible signals, all of
which occur with positive probability. For notational simplicity, we choose to work instead with a common set
T 0 of possible signals, but allow some of these to have zero probability for some agents. There is no loss of
generality in this latter approach.
4 Because Ω = S × T , the mapping t˜i can also be viewed as a projection from T to T 0.
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generality that each true state s ∈ S is non-null in the sense that pis := PS({s}) > 0; let P Ts be
the conditional probability measure on (T, T ) given that the random variable s˜ takes value s.
Thus, for each B ∈ T , one has P Ts (B) = P ({s} ×B)/pis. It is obvious that P T =
∑
s∈S pisP
T
s .
Note that in the literature the conditional probability measure P Ts is often denoted as P (·|s).
For each fixed t ∈ T , define also the conditional probability measure PS(·|t) on S so that
for each fixed s ∈ S, the mapping T 3 t 7→ PS({s}|t) is T -measurable, with P ({s} × B) =∫
B P
S({s}|t) dP T for each B ∈ T . Let T 3 t 7→ ps(t) ∈ R+ be the density function of P Ts with
respect to P T ; it is easy to see that PS({s}|t) = pis ps(t) for P T -almost all t ∈ T .
For each i ∈ I, let τi denote the marginal signal distribution of agent i on the space T 0;
it is defined so that for all q ∈ T 0, the probability P (t˜i = q) equals τi({q}). Let PS×T−i(·|ti)
denote the conditional probability measure on the product measurable space (S×T−i,S ⊗T−i)
given that agent i’s signal is ti ∈ T 0. For any ti ∈ T 0 with marginal probability τi({ti}) > 0, it
is clear that for any E ∈ S ⊗ T−i, one has PS×T−i(E|ti) = P (E × {ti})/τi({ti}). Denote by C
the completed sub-σ-algebra of F = S ⊗T on Ω = S×T that is generated by the union of the
finite family {{s} × T : s ∈ S} with the set of all P -null subsets of S × T .
Let f denote the private signal process from I ×Ω to the finite type space T 0 defined
so that f(i, ω) = t˜i(ω). Typically, for each ω ∈ Ω the mapping i 7→ f(i, ω) will not be I-
measurable. Assume that f is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C, and also
admits an essentially regular conditional distribution process µ given C. By definition of the
latter, we know that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the marginal process Ω ∈ ω 7→ µi(ω) ∈ ∆(T 0) is a
regular conditional distribution of Ω ∈ ω 7→ fi(ω) ∈ T 0 given C.
Let µ¯ :=
∫
I µidλ be the mean conditional signal distribution over all agents. Then the
Fubini property implies that µ¯ is a C-measurable mapping from Ω to ∆(T 0). We assume that
the process f is non-trivial in the sense that C is the same as the completed sub-σ-algebra of F
generated by µ¯ together with the P -null subsets of Ω. This means that the mean conditional
signal distribution carries the same information as the true state.
Let {As}s∈S be the C-measurable partition of Ω such that s˜(ω) = s for any ω ∈ As.
Then C is generated by the finite family {As}s∈S . Since µ¯ is C-measurable, there exists a
corresponding finite collection of measures {µs}s∈S in ∆(T 0) such that µ¯(ω) =
∑
s∈S 1As(ω)µs
for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω. It is clear that µs is the agents’ average signal distribution conditional
on the true state being s. The non-triviality assumption above implies that
∀s, s′ ∈ S, s 6= s′ =⇒ µs 6= µs′ . (5)
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5.2 A state contingent large economy
First, we define a complete information economy Ec. The common consumption set of each
agent i ∈ I is the positive orthant Rm+ . Suppose that for any given i ∈ I and true state s ∈ S,
the mapping Rm+ 3 x 7→ ui(x; s) is agent i’s utility function when the state is s. For any given
i ∈ I and s ∈ S, assume that Rm+ 3 x 7→ ui(x; s) ∈ R is continuous and strictly monotonic
in x ∈ Rm+ in the sense that
x˜ = x and x˜ 6= x =⇒ ui(x˜; s) > ui(x; s)
Assume too that for any fixed x ∈ Rm+ and s ∈ S, the mapping I 3 i 7→ ui(x; s) is I-measurable
in i ∈ I.5
In this section, let ‖x‖ denote the Euclidean norm of any vector x ∈ Rm. Assume also
that, in addition to continuity of each individual’s utility function Rm+ 3 x 7→ ui(x; s), the
entire family of utility functions Rm+ 3 x 7→ ui(x; s) as (i, s) varies over I × S is uniformly
equicontinuous in the sense that, for any  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that ‖x − x˜‖ < δ
implies |u(i, x, s)− u(i, x˜, s)| <  for all i ∈ I, all x, x˜ ∈ Rm+ , and all s ∈ S.
Let I 3 i 7→ e(i) ∈ Rm+ be the λ-integrable endowment function specifying each agent
i’s initial endowment. Assume that the mean endowment vector e¯ :=
∫
I e(i) dλ satisfies e¯ 0,
meaning that the mean endowment of each good is positive. Let ∆m denote the unit simplex
in Rm+ .
For each s ∈ S, the collection Ecs = {(I, I, λ), uIs, eI}, consisting of an atomless probability
space of agents with their respective utility functions x 7→ ui(x; s) and endowment vectors ei,
together constitutes a large deterministic exchange economy. A complete information economy
is a collection Ec = {Ecs : s ∈ S} specifying the deterministic economy Ecs for each s ∈ S. The
following provides the definition of the basic concept of a Walrasian allocation.
Definition 4 1. An allocation for Ec is a function
I × S 3 (i, s) 7→ xcs(i) ∈ Rm+ (6)
such that for any fixed s ∈ S, the mapping i 7→ xcs(i) is λ-integrable.
2. An allocation (i, s) 7→ xcs(i) is feasible in Ec if, for each s ∈ S, one has
∫
I x
c
s(i) dλ =∫
I e(i) dλ (i.e., x
c
s is feasible in Ecs).
3. A feasible allocation (i, s) 7→ xcs(i) is a Walrasian (or competitive equilibrium) alloca-
tion in Ec if for each s ∈ S, there is a price system ps ∈ ∆m which, together with the
5In the sequel, we shall often use subscripts to denote some argument of a function that is viewed as a
parameter in a particular context.
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feasible allocation xcs, makes (x
c
s, ps) a competitive or Walrasian equilibrium in the large
deterministic economy Ecs , in the sense that for λ-a.e. i ∈ I, given i’s Walrasian budget
set
Bi(ps) := {x ∈ Rm+ : ps · x ≤ ps · e(i)} (7)
one has
xcs(i) ∈ arg maxx {ui(x; s) : x ∈ Bi(ps)} (8)
5.3 Monte Carlo sampling economies
We shall now apply Monte Carlo sampling to economies with a continuum of agents who
have asymmetric information. Each agent i ∈ I is informed about her private signal ti ∈ T 0,
but not the true state s ∈ S. Fix any i∞ ∈ I∞ drawn from the iteratively completed infinite
product probability space (I∞, I¯∞, λ¯∞). In the asymmetric information Monto Carlo sampling
economy E i∞ , there is a countable set of sampled agents i∞ ∈ I∞.
For any x ∈ Rm+ and t ∈ T , let Ui(x|t) :=
∑
s∈S ui(x; s)P
S({s}|t) denote agent i’s
conditional expected utility of consumption bundle x given the type t.
A function z from (T, T ) to Rm+ is said to be a consumption plan in E i
∞
if for any pair
t, t′ ∈ T of type profiles that coincide on i∞, one has z(t) = z(t′). That is, a consumption plan
only depends on reported types of agents in the set I(i∞) defined by
I(i∞) := ∪∞k=1{ik} (9)
Let CP (i∞) be the space of consumption plans in E i∞ . For any agent i ∈ I(i∞) and a
consumption plan z ∈ CP (i∞), let
Ui(z) :=
∫
Ω
ui(z(t); s) dP =
∑
s∈S
pis
∫
T
ui(z(t); s) dP
T
s (10)
be the overall expected utility of agent i for the consumption plan t 7→ z(t).
An allocation in E i∞ is a function I∞ 3 i∞ 7→ xi∞ ∈ CP (i∞). For any allocation xi∞ ,
any agent i ∈ I(i∞), and any pair of private signals ti, t′i ∈ T 0, let
U i
∞
i (x
i∞
i , t
′
i|ti) :=
∫
S×T−i
u(i, xi
∞
i (t−i, t
′
i), s)dP
S×T−i(·|ti)
denote agent i’s conditional expected utility when she receives the private signal ti but mis-
reports it as t′i.
5.4 Asymptotically feasible and Pareto efficient incentive compatible allocations
To discuss incentive compatibility, we invoke the revelation principle due to [6, 23], extended
in an obvious way to a continuum of consumers. That is, we consider a direct revelation
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mechanism in which reporting one’s type truthfully is a Bayesian equilibrium for every agent
in the corresponding game of incomplete information. Specifically, let g denote the agents’
joint reporting process I × T 3 (i, t) 7→ g(i, t) ∈ T 0 with g(i, t) = t˜(i) for all (i, t) ∈ I × T . Let
G : I∞ × T → (T 0)∞ be the corresponding Monte Carlo sampling process of g. The following
claim, which will be proved in Section 6.4, shows that g also has a stochastic macro structure.
Claim 2 There is a countably generated sub-sigma-algebra C′ of T such that g is regularly
conditionally independent given C′.
By Theorem 1, this implies that the space (I∞ × T, I¯∞ ⊗ T , λ¯∞ ⊗ P T ) has a one-way
Fubini extension (I∞ × T, W˜, Q˜) such that G is W˜-measurable.
Definition 5.1 1. An allocation mechanism is a mapping
I∞ × I × T 3 (i∞, i, t) 7→ xi∞(i, t) ∈ Rm+
2. The allocation mechanism (i∞, i, t) 7→ xi∞(i, t) is asymptotically feasible if, for Q˜-almost
all (i∞, t) ∈ I∞ × T , one has∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
xi
∞
(ik, t)− 1
n
n∑
k=1
e(ik)
∥∥∥∥∥→ 0 as n→∞
3. The allocation mechanism (i∞, i, t) 7→ xi∞(i, t) is incentive compatible if, for Q˜-almost
all (i∞, t) ∈ I∞ × T , the incentive constraint U i∞i
(
xi
∞
i , t|t
) ≥ U i∞i (xi∞i , t′|t) holds for
any i ∈ I(i∞) and any t′ ∈ T 0.
4. The allocation mechanism (i∞, i, t) 7→ xi∞(i, t) is ex post individually rational if, for
Q˜-almost all (i∞, t) ∈ I∞ × T , one has U i∞i
(
xi
∞
i |t
) ≥ U i∞i (ei|t).
5. The allocation mechanism (i∞, i, t) 7→ xi∞(i, t) is asymptotically Pareto efficient if, for
Q˜-almost all (i∞, t) ∈ I∞ × T , the following holds: for any  > 0, there is no sequence
y : N → Rm+ such that: (i) as n → ∞, so
∥∥ 1
n
∑n
k=1 yk − 1n
∑n
k=1 e(ik)
∥∥ → 0; (ii) for any
i ∈ I(i∞), one has U i∞i (yi|t) ≥ U i
∞
i (x
i∞
i |t) + .
Now we are ready to state the following result for economies generated by Monto Carlo
sampling.
Theorem 3 There exists an allocation mechanism (i∞, i, t) 7→ xi∞(i, t) which is asymptotically
feasible, incentive compatible, ex post individually rational and asymptotically Pareto efficient.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Iteratively complete products
Let (Ik, Ik, λk)(k ∈ N) be a sequence of probability spaces. We use the same notation whether
or not the spaces Pk = (Ik, Ik, λk) are identical copies of a fixed space (I, I, λ). Let
Pn :=
n∏
k=1
Pk = (In, In, λn) :=
(
n∏
k=1
Ik,
⊗n
k=1
Ik,
⊗n
k=1
λk
)
denote the respective n-fold product, and let
P∞ :=
∞∏
k=1
Pk = (I∞, I∞, λ∞) :=
( ∞∏
k=1
Ik,
⊗∞
k=1
Ik,
⊗∞
k=1
λk
)
denote the infinite product counterpart.
The following definition is taken from [12].
Definition 5 A subset E of the n-fold Cartesian product set In is said to be iteratively null
in Pn if for every permutation pi on {1, . . . , n}, the n-fold iterated integral∫
ipi(1)∈Ipi(1)
. . .
∫
ipi(n)∈Ipi(n)
1E(i1, i2, . . . , in) dλpi(n)(ipi(n)) . . . dλpi(1)(ipi(1)) (11)
of the indicator function In 3 in 7→ 1E(in) ∈ {0, 1} for the set E is well-defined and has
value zero; in other words, for λpi(1)-a.e. ipi(1) ∈ Ipi(1), λpi(2)-a.e. ipi(2) ∈ Ipi(2), . . . , λpi(n)-a.e.
ipi(n) ∈ Ipi(n), one has (i1, i2, . . . , in) /∈ E.
The following two propositions from [12] show that one can extend both the finite product
probability space Pn and the infinite product probability space P∞ by including all iteratively
null sets, then forming the iterated completion.
Proposition 3 Given any n ∈ N, let En denote the family of all iteratively null sets in the
n-fold product (In, In, λn). Then there exists a complete and countably additive probability
space
P¯n := (In, I¯n, λ¯n) :=
(
In,
⊗n
k=1
Ik,
⊗n
k=1
λk
)
that satisfies the Fubini property, with:
1. I¯n as the σ-algebra σ(In ∪ En), which is equal to the collection
In4En := {D4E : D ∈ In, E ∈ En };
2. λ¯n as the unique measure that satisfies λ¯n(D4E) := λn(D) whenever D ∈ In and E ∈ En.
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Proposition 4 There exists a countably additive probability space
P¯∞ := (I∞, I¯∞, λ¯∞) :=
(
I∞,
⊗∞
k=1
Ik,
⊗∞
k=1
λk
)
in which
1. I¯∞ is the σ-algebra generated by the union G := ∪∞n=1Gn of the families Gn of cylinder
sets taking the form Gn = A×
∏∞
k=n+1 Ik for some A ∈ I¯n;
2. λ¯∞ is the unique countably additive extension to I¯∞ of the set function µ : G → [0, 1]
defined so that µ(A×∏∞k=n+1 Ik) := λ¯n(A) for all A ∈ I¯n.
Moreover, for any D¯ ∈ I¯∞, there exist D ∈ I∞ and E ∈ I¯∞ such that D¯ = D4E and
λ¯∞(E) = 0.
Unlike the finite product P¯n, the infinite product measure space P¯∞ in Proposition 4
may not be complete in the usual sense. One can always complete it by the usual procedure
(see, for example, [9] pp. 78–79). We still use the same notation to denote this completion,
which also retains the property stated in the last sentence of Proposition 4.
The completed probability space P¯∞ will be called the iterated completion of P∞, as
well as the iteratively complete product of the spaces Pk (k ∈ N). Let i∞ = (i1, i2, . . . , in, . . .)
denote a general element of I∞.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 1
First, let
D∞ := {i∞ = (ik)∞k=1 ∈ I∞ : (gik)∞k=1 is mutually conditionally independent given C} (12)
denote the set of all infinite sequences i∞ ∈ I∞ such that the associated sequence of random
variables gik (k ∈ N) are mutually conditionally independent given C.
Next, for any n ∈ N, let
Dn := {in = {ik}nk=1 ∈ In : {gik}nk=1 is mutually conditionally independent given C}
denote the projection of the set D∞ ⊂ I∞ onto the finite subproduct set In of all sequences of
length n. Since g is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C, and also admits an
essentially regular conditional distribution process µ given C, Theorem 1 in [12] implies that
Dn ∈ I¯n and λ¯n(Dn) = 1 for any n ∈ N .
For each n ∈ N, let
En := {(i∞, j∞) ∈ I∞ × I∞ : (i1, . . . , in, j1, . . . , jn) ∈ D2n}
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It is easy to see that λ¯∞ ⊗ λ¯∞(En) = λ¯2n(D2n) = 1. Let E = ∩∞n=1En. It is clear that
λ¯∞ ⊗ λ¯∞(E) = 1 (13)
Also, for any (i∞, j∞) ∈ E, let G(i∞) := {gik : k ∈ N} and G(j∞) := {gjk : k ∈ N} denote
the associated countable sets of random variables. Then we know that the random variables
in the set G(i∞)∪G(j∞) are mutually conditionally independent given C. It follows from (13)
that, for λ¯∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞, the random variables in G(i∞) ∪G(j∞) are mutually conditionally
independent given C for λ¯∞-a.e. j∞ ∈ I∞.
Note that the infinite product σ-algebra B∞ is generated by the family of all infinite
cylinder sets which, for some n ∈ N and some collection B1, . . . Bn ∈ B of n Borel sets, take the
form
∏n
i=1Bi ×X∞. To prove that µ¯ is an essentially regular conditional distribution process
given C, it is enough to consider the pi-system consisting of these cylinder sets.
Fix any i∞ = (ik)∞k=1 ∈ D∞, where D∞ was defined in (12). For any B1, . . . Bn ∈ B,
mutual conditional independence given C of all the random variables in the sequence (gik)∞k=1
implies that for P -a.e. ω ∈ Ω one has
P
(
(G(i∞))−1 (B1 × · · · ×Bn ×X∞) | C
)
(ω) = P
(
(gi1 , . . . , gin)
−1 (B1 × · · · ×Bn) | C
)
(ω)
= P
(
g−1i1 (B1) | C
)
(ω) · · ·P (g−1in (Bn) | C) (ω)
= µi1ω(B1) · · ·µinω(Bn)
But definition (3) implies that
µi1ω(B1) · · ·µinω(Bn) = µ¯i∞ω (B1 × · · · ×Bn ×X∞)
So this proves that I∞ × Ω 3 (i∞, ω) 7→ µ¯i∞ω is an essentially regular conditional distribution
process of G given C. Therefore, Theorem 1 in [14] implies that there exists a one-way Fubini
extension (I∞ × Ω, W˜, Q˜) of (I∞ × Ω, I¯∞ ⊗F , λ¯∞ ⊗ P ) such that G is W˜-measurable.
6.3 Proofs of the results in Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1:
Take as given the real-valued functions h and f specified at the start of Section 4, as
well as the regular conditional process I ×Ω 3 (i, ω) 7→ µiω ∈M(X) defined in Section 3. For
any i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω, let
ϕ(i, ω) :=
∫
X
hi(x) dµiω and ψ(i, ω) := f(i, ω)− ϕ(i, ω) (14)
We first prove that the random variable Ω 3 ω 7→ ∫I ϕ(i, ω) dλ = ∫I [∫X hi(x) dµiω] dλ
belongs to L2(P ). The property of essentially regular conditional distribution processes implies
that
for λ-almost all i ∈ I, one has ϕ(i, ω) = E[f(i)|C](ω) P -a.s. (15)
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Thus, by the Fubini property and Jensen’s inequality, one has∫
Ω
[∫
I ϕ(i, ω) dλ
]2
dP =
∫
Ω
[∫
I E[f(i)|C](ω) dλ
]2
dP
≤ ∫Ω [∫I (E[f(i)|C](ω))2 dλ] dP = ∫I [∫Ω (E[f(i)|C](ω))2 dP] dλ
≤ ∫I [∫Ω E[f2(i)|C](ω)dP ] dλ = ∫I [∫Ω f2(i, ω) dP ] dλ
Because of our assumption that
∫
I
[∫
Ω h
2
i (gi(ω)) dP
]
dλ =
∫
I
[∫
Ω f
2
i (ω) dP
]
dλ is finite, the last
integral is finite. This proves that the function ω 7→ ∫I ϕ(i, ω) dλ also belongs to L2(P ). Also ϕ
can be viewed as essentially a function from (I, I, λ) to L2(C, P ), the space of real-valued,
C-measurable and square integrable functions on (Ω,F , P ).
Since C is countably generated, we know that L2(C, P ) is separable, which implies that ϕ
is λ-essentially separably valued.6 It is easy to see that ϕ is also weakly λ-measurable.7 Then
Theorem 2 in page 42 of [7] implies that the function i 7→ ϕ(i) is λ-measurable. Hence, there
exists a sequence of simple functions i 7→ ϕk(i) with limk→∞ ‖ϕk − ϕ‖ = 0 for λ-a.e. i ∈ I.
From (15) note that
∫
I ‖ϕ(i)‖2dλ =
∫
I
[∫
Ω (E[f(i)|C](ω))2 dP
]
dλ. Thus, Jensen’s inequality
implies that ∫
I
||ϕ(i)||2dλ ≤
∫
I
∫
Ω
E[f2(i)|C] dPdλ =
∫
I
∫
Ω
f(i)2dPdλ <∞
But then the Cauchy–Schwarz inequlity implies that∫
I
‖ϕ(i)‖dλ ≤
(∫
I
‖ϕ(i)‖2dλ
) 1
2
<∞
By Theorem 2 on page 45 of [7], we know that ϕ viewed as a function from (I, I, λ) to
L2(P ) is Bochner integrable. Next, the classical law of large numbers for Bochner integrable
functions, as shown in [3] and [22] (see also [8] and [17]), says that for λ∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞, one
has
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
ϕ(ik)−
∫
I
∫
X
hi(x) dµiωdλ
∥∥∥∥∥ = 0 (16)
The proof of Lemma 11 in [13] shows that there exists D∗ ∈ I¯∞ with λ¯∞(D∗) = 1 such
that for any i∞ ∈ D∗, the random variables (ψik)∞k=1 defined by (14) are mutually orthogonal.
This implies that for any i∞ ∈ D∗, we have∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
ψ(ik)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
n2
n∑
k=1
‖ψ(ik)‖2 (17)
Since
∫
I ‖ψ(i)‖2 dλ <∞, the usual strong law of large numbers implies that for λ∞-a.e.
i∞ ∈ I∞ one has
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
‖ψ(ik)‖2 =
∫
I
‖ψ(i)‖2 dλ (18)
6See page 42 in [7] for formal definitions.
7See page 41 in [7] for formal definitions.
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It clearly follows that for λ¯∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞, one has
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
ψ(ik)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= 0 (19)
Combining Equations (16) and (19), while using definition (14) of the function i 7→ ψ(i) ∈ R,
it follows that for λ¯∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞, one has
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
f(ik)−
∫
I
∫
X
hi(x) dµiω(x) dλ
∥∥∥∥∥
= lim
n→∞
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
ψ(ik) +
1
n
n∑
k=1
ϕ(ik)−
∫
I
∫
X
hi(x) dµiω(x)dλ
∥∥∥∥∥ = 0
This completes the proof.
The following lemma is a special case of a result in [13], which generalizes part of Lemma
2.1 in [17, p. 304] to the setting of iteratively complete product spaces.
Lemma 1 For each n ∈ N, let Sn be a subset of I whose λ-outer measure is one. Then the
λ¯∞-outer measure of
∏∞
n=1 Sn is also one.
The next lemma is also taken from [13]. It generalizes to iteratively complete products
one part of Theorem 2.4 in [17, p. 310], which is due to Talagrand.
Lemma 2 Let g be a real-valued function on (I, I, λ). Suppose there is a real constant c such
that
lim
n→∞
g(i1) + · · ·+ g(in)
n
= c for λ¯∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞ (20)
Then g is λ-integrable, with
∫
I g(i) dλ = c.
The proof of following lemma adapts some of the ideas used in the proofs of Lemma 2.1
and Theorem 2.4 in [17], and of Lemma 1.4 in [16].
Lemma 3 If a function f from T to a Banach space B satisfies SLLN, then it is norm integrably
bounded.
Proof: Let f ∈ SLLN(B), with ‖a − 1n
∑n
k=1 f(ik)‖ → 0 for λ¯∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞. Let D be the
set of all i∞ ∈ I∞ such that ‖ 1nf(in)‖ → 0 as n→∞. Because of the decomposition
1
n
f(in) = −
[
a− 1
n
n∑
k=1
f(ik)
]
+
n− 1
n
[
a− 1
n− 1
n−1∑
k=1
f(ik)
]
+
1
n
a
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it follows that∥∥∥∥ 1nf(in)
∥∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥a− 1n
n∑
k=1
f(ik)
∥∥∥∥∥+ n− 1n
∥∥∥∥∥a− 1n− 1
n−1∑
k=1
f(ik)
∥∥∥∥∥+ 1n‖a‖ (21)
Now each term on the right-hand side of (21) converges λ¯∞-a.s. to 0, so λ¯∞(D) = 1.
Let i 7→ g(i) be an upper λ-envelope of i 7→ ‖f(i)‖, in the sense that g : I → R+∪{∞}
is an I-measurable function satisfying: (i) g(i) ≥ ‖f(i)‖ for all i ∈ I; (ii) for any I-measurable
function h from I to R+ ∪ {∞}, the λ-inner measure of the set { i ∈ I : ‖f(i)‖ ≤ h(i) < g(i) }
is zero (see [17, p. 302]). For each n ∈ N, define
Sn := {i ∈ I : g(i) ≤ 2‖f(i)‖ or ‖f(i)‖ ≥ n}
Define the function hn := min{n, 12g} on I, which is evidently I-measurable. Also, it is clear
that ‖f(i)‖ < hn(i) < g(i) for all i ∈ I \ Sn (even when g(i) =∞). By definition of the upper
λ-envelope, therefore, the set I \ Sn must have λ-inner measure zero, implying that its λ-outer
measure of Sn is one. Lemma 1 says that then the set
∏∞
n=1 Sn also has λ¯
∞-outer measure one,
and so therefore does D ∩∏∞n=1 Sn.
Fix any i∞ ∈ D ∩∏∞n=1 Sn. Since ‖ 1nf(in)‖ → 0 as n→∞, one must have ‖f(in)‖ < n
for sufficiently large n, and then in ∈ Sn implies that 0 ≤ g(in) ≤ 2‖f(in)‖. Hence, 1ng(in)→ 0.
But g is I-measurable by definition, so 1ng(in)→ 0 for all i∞ in some I∞-measurable superset
E of D∩∏∞n=1 Sn. Since the λ¯∞-outer measure of D∩∏∞n=1 Sn is one, it follows that λ¯∞(E) =
λ∞(E) = 1.
Given any i∞ ∈ I∞, let φ(i∞) := supn∈N 1ng(in). Then φ(i∞) is finite for all i∞ ∈ E.
Because g is I-measurable, the function φ : I → R+ ∪ {∞} must be I∞-measurable. So there
exists a positive integer K such that
λ∞ ({ i∞ ∈ I∞ : φ (i∞) < K }) > 12 (22)
For each n ∈ N, let αn := λ ({i ∈ I : g(i) ≥ nK}). Because λ∞ is a product measure, it is
evident that
λ∞ ({ i∞ ∈ I∞ : φ (i∞) < K }) =
∞∏
n=1
(1− αn) (23)
Obviously (22) and (23) imply that
∏∞
n=1(1− αn) > 12 . But ln(1− αn) ≤ −αn, so
∞∑
n=1
αn ≤ −
∞∑
n=1
ln(1− αn) < − ln(1/2) = ln 2 <∞ (24)
This implies that limn→∞ αn = 0, and so λ ({i ∈ I : g(i) =∞}) = 0.
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Given any fixed i ∈ I with g(i) <∞, let m be the smallest integer such that g(i) < mK.
Then g(i) ∈ [nK,∞) for n ∈ { 1, . . . ,m − 1 }, and so ∑∞n=1 1[nK,∞)(g(i)) = m − 1. It follows
that
g(i) ≤ K +K
∞∑
n=1
1[nK,∞)(g(i)) (25)
for all i ∈ I with g(i) < ∞. Because λ ({i ∈ I : g(i) =∞}) = 0, the definition of αn implies
that
∫
I 1[nK,∞)(g(i)) dλ = αn. It follows from (24) and (25), therefore, that∫
I
g dλ ≤ K +K
∞∑
n=1
αn < K(1 + ln 2) <∞
Finally, let f∗ be the function from I to R+ such that f∗(i) = g(i) when g(i) < ∞ and
f∗(i) = 0 when g(i) =∞. Clearly f∗ is a norm dominant λ-integrable function for ‖f‖, so f is
norm integrably bounded.
Two functions f and f˜ from (I, I, λ) to a Banach space B are said to be scalarly
equivalent if, for any b′ ∈ B′, the corresponding real-valued functions i 7→ 〈f(i), b′〉 and
i 7→ 〈f˜(i), b′〉 are equal for λ-a.e. i ∈ I.
Lemma 4 Let H be a Hilbert space and f a function in L(λ,H) that is scalarly equivalent to
the zero function. Then
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
f(ik)
∥∥∥∥∥ = 0 for λ¯∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞ (26)
Proof: Given f ∈ L(λ,H), let g : I → R+ be a λ-integrable function that norm dominates f .
For each k ∈ N, let Xk be the random variable defined on (I∞, I∞, λ∞) by Xk (i∞) := [g(ik)]2.
Since EX1/21 < ∞ and the variables Xk are i.i.d., the Marcinkiewicz–Zygmund Theorem for
the case p = 1/2 and c = 0 (see [5, p. 125]) implies that n−2
∑n
k=1Xk (i
∞) → 0 for λ∞-
a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞. Because the definition of g implies that ‖f(i)‖ ≤ g(i) for all i ∈ I, we have
‖f(ik)‖2 ≤ [g(ik)]2 = Xk (i∞) for all k ∈ N. It follows that n−2
∑n
k=1 ‖f(ik)‖2 → 0 for λ∞-a.e.
i∞ ∈ I∞.
Next, we follow the idea behind some of the computations in the proof of Theorem 1.3
in [8, p. 277]. For any i∞ ∈ I∞, we have∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
f(ik)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
n2
n∑
k=1
‖f(ik)‖2 + 2
n2
∑
1≤j<k≤n
〈f(ij), f(ik)〉 (27)
Because f is scalarly equivalent to zero, for any h ∈ H one has 〈f(i), h〉 = 0 for λ-a.e. i ∈ I.
In particular, for any i′ ∈ I, one has 〈f(i), f(i′)〉 = 0 for λ-a.e. i ∈ I. Hence there exists a
I¯2-measurable set D ⊆ I × I such that λ¯2(D) = 1 and 〈f(i), f(i′)〉 = 0 for all (i, i′) ∈ D. For
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each pair j, k ∈ N, let Djk denote the set of all sequences i∞ ∈ I∞ such that (ij , ik) ∈ D,
and define D∗ := ∩∞j=1 ∩∞k=j+1 Djk. Then for all i∞ ∈ D∗ one has 〈f(ij), f(ik)〉 = 0 for all
j, k ∈ N with j < k. Obviously Djk ∈ I¯∞ and λ¯∞(Djk) = 1 for each j, k ∈ N, so D∗ ∈ I¯∞ and
λ¯∞(D∗) = 1 also.
Combining the results in the last two paragraphs shows that (27) implies (26).
Proof of Theorem 2:
Let h be a function from I to the Banach space B such that, for some a ∈ B, one has limn→∞ ‖a−
1
n
∑n
k=1 h(ik)‖ = 0 for λ∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞. Take any fixed b′ ∈ B′, and let I 3 i 7→ g(i) ∈ R
be defined so that g(i) := 〈h(i), b′〉 for all i ∈ I. A routine calculation shows that, for λ¯∞-a.e.
i∞ ∈ I∞, one has
lim
n→∞
1
n
[g(i1) + · · ·+ g(in)] = 〈a, b′〉
Then Lemma 2 implies that g is λ-integrable, with
∫
I g(i) dλ = 〈a, b′〉. Hence, h is Gel ′fand
integrable and has a as its Gel ′fand integral. Lemma 3 implies that h is also norm integrably
bounded.
Now suppose that B is a Hilbert space H. Let f be any function in L(λ,H). Since f
is Gel ′fand integrable, it follows from [1, Theorem 11.51] (or [7, p. 52]) that for each S ∈ I,
the function i 7→ 1S(i) f(i) is Gel ′fand integrable, where i 7→ 1S(i) ∈ {0, 1} is the indicator
function of the measurable set S. Let ν(S) denote its Gel ′fand integral over I, which is
an element of H. It follows that ‖ν(S)‖2 = 〈ν(S), ν(S)〉 = ∫I〈(1Sf)(i), ν(S)〉dλ. By the
hypothesis of norm integrable boundedness, there exists a λ-integrable function f∗ : I → R+
such that ‖f(i)‖ ≤ f∗(i) for λ-a.e. i ∈ I, and so 〈(1Sf)(i), ν(S)〉 ≤ (1Sf∗)(i)‖ν(S)‖. Hence
‖ν(S)‖2 ≤ ∫I(1Sf∗)(i)‖ν(S)‖dλ. So even when ν(S) = 0, one has
‖ν(S)‖ ≤
∫
S
f∗(i) dλ (28)
Let S1, S2, . . . ∈ T be any countable collection of pairwise disjoint measurable subsets
of T . Obviously ν (∪nk=1Sk) =
∑n
k=1 ν(Sk) for n = 1, 2, . . .. Furthermore, (28) implies that
n∑
k=1
‖ν(Sk)‖ ≤
n∑
k=1
∫
Sk
f∗(i) dλ ≤
∫
T
f∗(i) dλ < +∞ (29)
It follows that the sequence defined by sn := ν (∪nk=1Sk) =
∑n
k=1 ν(Sk) is a Cauchy sequence,
and so convergent in the complete normed space H. Hence ν (∪∞k=1Sk) =
∑∞
k=1 ν(Sk). It follows
from (29) that ν is an H-valued σ-additive measure of bounded variation. Moreover, (28) also
implies that the vector measure ν is absolutely continuous w.r.t. λ.
Next, we shall show that f is scalarly equivalent to a Bochner integrable function φ from
(I, I, λ) to H. Because the Hilbert space H is a particular kind of reflexive Banach space, it has
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the Radon–Nikodym property (see [7, p. 82]). So there exists a Bochner integrable function φ
from (I, I, λ) to H such that ν(S) equals the Bochner integral ∫S φ(i) dλ for each S ∈ I. Now
the Bochner integral, when it exists, must equal the Gel ′fand integral (see, for example, [1,
p. 423]). So given any h ∈ H, it follows that
〈ν(S), h〉 =
∫
S
〈φ(i), h〉dλ =
∫
S
〈f(i), h〉dλ
Because the choice of S ∈ I was arbitrary, one has 〈f(i), h〉 = 〈φ(i), h〉 for λ-a.e. i ∈ I. That
is, f is scalarly equivalent to φ.8
Define ψ := f−φ. Because φ is Bochner integrable, it follows from [7, p. 45], for example,
that ‖φ‖ is integrable. Clearly, then, ψ is norm integrably bounded, Gel ′fand integrable, and
scalarly equivalent to zero. So Lemma 4 implies that ψ ∈ LLN(H). Then the classical law of
large numbers for Bochner integrable functions, as shown in [3] and [22] (see also [8] and [17]),
says that φ is in LLN(H), and so in SLLN(H) as well. Therefore f = φ+ ψ ∈ SLLN(H).
Proof of Claim 1: Let ϕ be any square integrable random variable on (Ω,F , P ). By the
property of regular conditional distribution process µ and the Fubini property, one has∫
Ω
[∫
I
∫
X
h(i, x) dµiωdλ
]
ϕ(ω) dP =
∫
I
∫
Ω
E[f(i, ω)|C]ϕ(ω) dPdλ
Proposition 2 in [14] implies that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the random variables ω 7→ fi(ω) and
ω 7→ ϕ(ω) are conditionally independent given C. Therefore, we have∫
Ω
[∫
I
∫
X
h(i, x) dµiωdλ
]
ϕ(ω) dP =
∫
I
∫
Ω
E[f(i, ω)ϕ(ω)|C] dPdλ =
∫
I
∫
Ω
f(i, ω)ϕ(ω) dPdλ
This implies that f is Gel ′fand integrable.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 3
By the usual existence result on Walrasian allocations in [2] and [15], we know that there
exists a Walrasian equilibrium (xc, p) for the economy Ec. Because we assumed that the utility
function Rm+ 3 x 7→ ui(x; s) of each agent i ∈ I is strictly monotonic, we know that for any
s ∈ S, the Walrasian equilibrium price vector ps is strictly positive.
Note that, by assumption, the private signal process I × Ω 3 (i, ω) 7→ f(i, ω) ∈ T 0 that
was introduced in Section 5.1 is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C and
admits an essentially regular conditional distribution process µ given C. Then Proposition 5
8The argument used in this paragraph is essentially the same as the simple argument on [7, p. 89], where the
case of norm bounded functions is considered. See also [18] for discussion and for many additional references
concerning this scalar equivalence result.
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in [13] implies that for λ¯∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞, there exists F ∈ F with P (F ) = 1 such that for any
ω ∈ F and any q ∈ T0, one has
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
1q(f(ik, ω)) = [µ¯(ω)](q) (30)
The usual strong law of large numbers implies that for λ∞-a.e. i∞ ∈ I∞ one has
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
e(ik) =
∫
I
e(i) dλ and lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
xcs(ik) =
∫
I
xcs(i) dλ for all s ∈ S (31)
Let D be the set of i∞ ∈ I∞ such that Equations (30) and (31) both hold. It is clear
that λ¯∞(D) = 1.
First, for any i∞ /∈ D and i ∈ I(i∞), construct xi∞(i, t) := e(i) for all t ∈ T . Also, for
any i∞ /∈ D and i ∈ I(i∞), the definition of Walrasian equilibrium implies that the inequality
U i
∞
i
(
xi
∞
i , ti|ti
) ≥ U i∞i (xi∞i , t′i|ti) holds for any ti, t′i ∈ T 0.
Alternatively, consider any fixed i∞ ∈ D. For any n ∈ N, t ∈ T and q ∈ T0, let
γi
∞
n (t, q) :=
1
n
∑∞
k=1 1{q}(tik). This defines a mapping T 3 t 7→ γi
∞
n (t) ∈ ∆(T 0). For any t ∈ T ,
given the counting measure γ¯ on the finite set T 0, let
γi
∞
(t) :=
{
limn→∞ γi
∞
n (t) if the limit exists
γ¯ otherwise
(32)
Next, define the sets
Li
∞
s := {t ∈ T : γi
∞
(t) = µs} for all s ∈ S, and Li∞0 := T \
⋃
s∈S
Li
∞
s (33)
Because (30) holds P -a.s., it follows that P Ts (L
i∞
s ) = 1.
Also, the non-triviality assumption implies that for any s, s′ ∈ S with s 6= s′, one has
Li
∞
s ∩ Li
∞
s′ = ∅. Thus, the collection {Li
∞
0 } ∪ {Li
∞
s : s ∈ S} forms a measurable partition of T .
The definition (32) of γi
∞
obviously implies that for any i ∈ I(i∞) one has γi∞(t−i, ti) =
γi
∞
(t−i, t′i) for all t−i ∈ T−i and all ti, t′i ∈ T 0. Hence, for any i ∈ I(i∞), t ∈ T , t′i ∈ T 0, and
s ∈ S, one has
t ∈ Li∞s ⇐⇒ γi
∞
(t) = µs ⇐⇒ γi∞(t−i, t′i) = µs ⇐⇒ (t−i, t′i) ∈ Li
∞
s . (34)
Since Li
∞
0 equals T \ ∪s∈SLi
∞
s , we also know that t ∈ Li
∞
0 ⇐⇒ (t−i, t′i) ∈ Li
∞
0 . Hence, for any
i ∈ I(i∞) we have xi∞(i, t) = xi∞(i, (t−i, t′i)) for all t ∈ T and t′i ∈ T 0. This trivially implies
that for any i ∈ I(i∞) and any ti, t′i ∈ T 0, the allocation I×T 3 (i, t) 7→ xi
∞
(i, t) ∈ Rm+ satisfies
the corresponding incentive constraint
U i
∞
i
(
xi
∞
i , ti|ti
) ≥ U i∞i (xi∞i , t′i|ti) (35)
22
For each s ∈ S, let δs denote the Dirac measure on S that gives probability one to the
point s and zero to all the other points of S. Define a function H from T to the space ∆(S) of
all probability measures on the finite set S by letting
H(t) :=
{
δs for the unique s ∈ S such that t ∈ Li∞s
δs1 for t ∈ Li
∞
0
Then the same proof as in Lemma 3 of [24] shows that for each t ∈ T , the measure H(t) is a
version of P s(·|t).
Now we are ready to prove Claim 2.
Proof of Claim 2: Fix any i∞ ∈ D. Let C′ be the σ-algebra generated by the finite family
{Li∞s : s ∈ S}. Note that for any s ∈ S, one has
P (t˜ ∈ Li∞s ) =
∑
s′∈S
pis′P
T
s′ (L
i∞
s ) = pisP
T
s (L
i∞
s ) = pis (36)
and P (s˜ = s|t˜ ∈ Li∞s ) =
P (s˜ = s, t˜ ∈ Li∞s )
P T (Li∞s )
=
pisP (t˜ ∈ Li∞s |s˜ = s)
pisP Ts (L
i∞
s )
= 1. (37)
Fix any s ∈ S, q, q′ ∈ T 0 and i, j ∈ I such that the random variables fi and fj from Ω to T 0
are conditionally independent given s. We know that
P T (gi = q, gj = q
′|Li∞s ) =
P (fi = q, fj = q
′, t˜ ∈ Li∞s )
P T (Li∞s )
=
pisP (fi = q, fj = q
′, t˜ ∈ Li∞s |s˜ = s)
pisP Ts (L
i∞
s )
Because P Ts (L
i∞
s ) = 1, whereas fi and fj are conditionally independent given s, we have
P T (gi = q, gj = q
′|Li∞s ) = P (fi = q, fj = q′, t˜ ∈ Li
∞
s |s˜ = s)
= P (fi = q, fj = q
′|s˜ = s)
= P (fi = q|s˜ = s) · P (fj = q′|s˜ = s)
= P T (gi = q|Li∞s ) · P T (gj = q′|Li
∞
s )
By Equations (36) and (37), we know that
P (fi = q|s˜ = s) · P (fj = q′|s˜ = s)
=
1
pi2s
P (fi = q, s˜ = s) · P (fj = q′, s˜ = s)
=
1
pi2s
P (t˜ ∈ Li∞s )2 · P (fi = q, s˜ = s|t˜ ∈ Li
∞
s ) · P (fj = q′, s˜ = s|t˜ ∈ Li
∞
s )
= P (fi = q|t˜ ∈ Li∞s ) · P (fj = q′|t˜ ∈ Li
∞
s )
= P T (gi = q|Li∞s ) · P T (gj = q′|Li
∞
s )
This implies that P T (gi = q, gj = q
′|Li∞s ) = P T (gi = q|Li
∞
s ) · P T (gj = q′|Li
∞
s ). Hence, g is
essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C′.
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For any i ∈ I, s ∈ S and t ∈ Li∞s , let νit denote µi(s,t), where µ is the essentially regular
conditional distribution process of f given C. It is clear that ν is an essentially regular con-
ditional distribution process of g given C′. Therefore, g is regularly conditionally independent
given C′.
This completes the proof of Claim 2. We now continue the proof of Theorem 3.
Let Ei
∞
s be the set of all t ∈ Li
∞
s such that P
T (·|t) = δs. Clearly P Ts (Ei
∞
s ) = 1 for any
t ∈ Ei∞s . Let Ei
∞
:= ∪s∈SEi∞s . Then
P T (Ei
∞
) =
∑
s′∈S
pis′P
T
s′ (∪s∈SEi
∞
s ) =
∑
s′∈S
pis′P
T
s′ (E
i∞
s′ ) =
∑
s′∈S
pis′ = 1
Given the Walrasian equilibrium allocation (i, s) 7→ xcs(i) for the economy Ec, as specified
by (6), define a mapping xi
∞
from I × T to Rm+ by letting
xi
∞
(i, t) :=
{
xcs(i) for the unique s ∈ S such that t ∈ Li
∞
s
e(i) if t ∈ Li∞0
(38)
It is clear that xi
∞
only depends on reports from agents i ∈ I(i∞). Hence xi∞ is an allocation
in the economy E i∞ .
Note that for any s ∈ S the feasibility condition in Part 2 of Definition 4 implies that∫
I x
c
s(i) dλ =
∫
I e(i) dλ, and also
limn→∞ 1n
∑n
k=1 x
i∞(ik, t) = limn→∞ 1n
∑n
k=1 e(ik) =
∫
I e(i) dλ, if t ∈ Li
∞
0
limn→∞ 1n
∑n
k=1 x
i∞(ik, t) = limn→∞ 1n
∑n
k=1 x
c
s(ik) =
∫
I x
c
s(i) dλ, if t ∈ Li
∞
s
These last equalities imply that, for any t ∈ T , as n → ∞, the allocation defined by (38)
satisfies the asymptotic feasibility condition∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
k=1
[xi
∞
(ik, t)− e(ik)]
∥∥∥∥∥→
∫
I
[xcs(i)− e(i)]dλ = 0 (39)
Now fix any s ∈ S and t ∈ Ei∞s . Evidently definition (7) implies that for any i ∈ I one
has e(i) ∈ Bi(ps). Since P T (·|t) = δs, it follows from (8) that for any i ∈ I(i∞), one has
U i
∞
i (x
i∞(i, t)|t) = ui(xcs(i); s) ≥ ui(e(i); s) = U i
∞
i (e(i)|t). (40)
This proves ex post individual rationality.
Finally, fix any  > 0. By uniform equicontinuity of the family of utility functions
Rm+ 3 x 7→ ui(x; s) (for i ∈ I and s ∈ S), there exists δ > 0 such that whenever x, x′ ∈ Rm+
satisfy ‖x− x′‖ < δ, then |ui(x; s)− ui(x′; s)| <  for all i ∈ I and s ∈ S.
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Let p¯s := minj∈{1,2,...,m} psj and δ′ := 12 p¯sδ. For any i ∈ I and s ∈ S, let M is := ps · e(i)
denote the value of agent i’s endowment at the equilibrium price vector ps that applies in the
economy Ecs .
Fix any i ∈ I(i∞) and x ∈ B(ps,M is + δ′). Let x′ = M
i
s
M is+δ
′x. It is clear that x
′ ∈
B(ps,M
i
s). By the definition of p¯s and δ
′, we have
‖x− x′‖ = δ
′
M is
‖x′‖ ≤ δ
′
ps · x′(i)‖x
′‖
≤ δ
′
p¯s ·
∑m
j=1 x
′
j(i)
‖x′‖ ≤ δ
′
p¯s ·
∑m
j=1 x
′
j(i)
m∑
j=1
x′j(i) =
1
2
δ < δ
This implies that ui(x; s) < ui(x
′; s) + . For any i ∈ I(i∞) and any x ∈ B(ps,M is + δ′), it
follows that
U i
∞
i (x|t) < U i
∞
i (x
i∞
i |t) +  (41)
Let I(i∞) 3 i 7→ yi → Rm+ be any sequence such that U i
∞
i (yi|t) ≥ U i
∞
i (x
i∞
i |t) +  for
all i ∈ I(i∞). From (41) it follows that ps · yi ≥ M is + δ′ for all i ∈ I(i∞), which implies that
1
n
∑n
k=1 ps · [yik − e(ik)] 9 0. It is clear then that no sequence I(i∞) 3 i 7→ yi → Rm+ such that
U i
∞
i (yi|t) ≥ U i
∞
i (x
i∞
i |t) +  for all i ∈ I(i∞) can satisfy the asymptotic feasibility condition
(39).
Finally, note that G : I∞ × T → (T 0)∞ is the Monte Carlo sampling process of g, and
that (I∞×T, W˜, Q˜) is a one-way Fubini extension of (I∞×T, I¯∞⊗T , λ¯∞⊗P T ) such that G is
W˜-measurable. Within the framework of this one-way Fubini extension, the arguments in this
section establish that the allocation mechanism (i∞, i, t) 7→ xi∞(i, t) is incentive compatible,
asymptotically feasible, ex post individually rational, and asymptotically Pareto efficient.
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